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Community-partnered contracts in developing countries
M. Sohail PhD, MASCE and A. N. Baldwin MSc, CEng, FICE
There is a growing recognition in developing countries of
community-based infrastructure procurement and its
potential to achieve sustainable development. The advan-
tages of such an approach are that it encourages partici-
pative negotiation of activities and speedier
implementation, the use of local resources, skills and
appropriate technology, and entrepreneurship within
communities. These wider socio-economic impacts aris-
ing from community-partnered micro-projects can lead
to more sustainable infrastructure through meeting local
stakeholders’ needs, community empowerment and capa-
city building. This paper describes the development and
use of performance indicators for community-contracted
urban infrastructure provision in low-income commu-
nities in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In particular, these
indicators refer to the dimensions of time and cost; some
key performance yardsticks are also proposed. The urban
infrastructure and services referred to in these cases are
the facilities needed for water and sanitation provision,
access roads, street lighting and solid waste management.
In general, it was found that costs for community-con-
tracted micro-projects were normally very close to being
on target. The quality of infrastructure and service provi-
sion also tended to be superior to that envisioned by local
government engineers. However, project duration gener-
ally exceeded the target but was still comparable to con-
ventional contracts. The overall performance of the
community-partnered micro-projects was found to be
comparable or better than the conventional micro-con-
tracts; in addition, the performance of these projects in
terms of socio-economic elements was likely to far exceed
that of the conventional micro-projects.
1. INTRODUCTION
By 2020, more than half of the world’s population will be living
in urban areas.1 In many cities, between 40 and 50% of the
population already live in slum or squatter settlements, which
lack basic services.2,3 The provision of urban services to city
dwellers, in both formal and informal settlements, is therefore
one of the biggest challenges faced by urban services managers
in developing countries.
The public sector has failed to meet such challenges, one of the
main reasons for this being widespread inertia which hampers
its ability to respond to fast-changing circumstances. There is
thus an urgent need for innovation in the delivery of
sustainable urban services. Sustainability is an increasingly
used term and has a number of meanings depending upon the
context. For the purposes of this study, urban services can be
said to be sustainable if the benefits of the service are realised
over a sustained period of time.
The concept of sustainable development in the context of urban
infrastructure becomes pertinent in the context of imbalances
of supply and demand. Parkin4,5 discussed the issues relating to
sustainable development and came up with the notion of
‘capacity for continuance’. The implication of the concept to
the current research is that urban infrastructure—along with its
wider impacts on social development—is a key contributor to
‘capacity for continuance’.
While international development practitioners have experi-
mented with urban service delivery to ensure ‘capacity for
continuance’, primarily through pilot projects, very few of these
have been scaled up and mainstreamed. There is also a lack of
data on the policy impacts of those ‘successful’ pilots.
This paper is about one type of innovation—that is, com-
munity-partnered procurement—and it provides evidence that
community contracts still exist after a decade, are working, and
that they are being mainstreamed and have potential for further
use. The paper is based on a long-term (six-year) research
programme on community contracts and performance
monitoring of micro-projects conducted by the Water,
Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC), Loughborough
University, UK.
Provision of urban services includes procuring infrastructure
projects that vary in size from large- to small-scale works.
Procurement is the process of buying goods, works and
services. There is no consensus on what exactly constitutes
‘small’. For example, the World Bank6 refers to ‘small-scale’
projects as those projects that have a total cost less than US$10
million. However, in the context of many South Asian
countries—in fact, in most of the developing world—many
small-scale projects have a total cost of a less than US$15000.
Development economists and engineers term these ‘micro-
projects’. They are the focus of this research, because the
majority of public works projects undertaken in developing
countries are of this size. The nature of these projects includes
the procurement of water and sanitation, constructing access
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roads/pavements, solid waste-related construction and provid-
ing small community buildings at a neighbourhood level.
Unfortunately there is a general lack of performance-related
information on such infrastructure, particularly that provided
through community-partnered contracts. This in turn is the
reason why such contracts are not being considered for wider
and more frequent use in developing countries. This general
lack of data is felt most acutely with respect to micro-projects.
At the outset of this research there was no international
performance analysis available, using yardsticks or indicators,
for monitoring the procurement and completion of such
projects. The principal challenge of this research was to address
this issue.
This research is based on data from a total of 800 ‘micro-
contracts’; of these, 400 were community-partnered contracts,
awarded by urban local authorities and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in South Asia—specifically, India, Paki-
stan and Sri Lanka. This paper provides a brief overview of the
procurement process used in these three countries, all of which
have a common legal framework developed during colonial
times under British law.
The paper is primarily concerned with time and cost issues in
community-partnered contracts in developing countries and
describes the development and use of a range of performance
indicators on these issues that may be used for micro-projects.
These indicators cover the procurement, execution and com-
pletion of works. Inter-organisational cooperation and partner-
ship indicators, together with indicators of the quality of work
and social benefits, are discussed more fully elsewhere.7
In order to understand the context of the research, the
following sections briefly describe the key roles in the
procurement process, an outline of a typical public works
procurement process, and the concept of community-partnered
procurement.
2. ANOUTLINEOF ATYPICAL PROCUREMENT
PROCESS
The three roles in the procurement process are the promoter, the
engineer and the contractor. The promoter plans and prepares
briefs, commissions design work and hires an engineer. He or
she in turn is usually responsible for design, monitoring and
quality assurance of the contracts and for hiring a contractor to
undertake the construction work.
In many government organisations, the engineer is a full-time
employee. It is rare for private-sector consultants to fulfil this
role for minor engineering works. The promoter wants the best
value for money and the contractor wants to maximise profit.
While this relationship can involve complex and contentious
issues, satisfactory performance can be broadly defined in terms
of the following three fundamental objectives.
(a) Quality: has the work been done in accordance with what
was specified?
(b) Time: has the work been completed satisfactorily within the
time specified?
(c) Cost: has the work been completed within the costs agreed
in the contract?
Procurement of urban infrastructure in the public sector is
regulated by the relevant legal, financial, municipal and
administrative rules. These rules were typically set out in Public
Works Department (PWD) procedures of the local governments
in the study countries.
The key steps that must be taken from when the need for
infrastructure is established to completion of the contract are
outlined in Table 1.
The costs associated with the project are as follows.
(a ) ‘Technical sanction cost’ is the cost on which the approval
of the project is based.
(b) ‘Engineer’s estimate’ is the cost on which the tenders are
called and later evaluated.
( c ) ‘Tender/contract letting cost’ is the cost on which the
contract is awarded.
(d) ‘Completion cost’ is the final cost of the contract, including
variations.
The chain of responsibility involves action by many different
officials. The whole process of procurement is very sensitive to
delays in approval procedures, which in turn cause delays in
awarding the contract and later delays in infrastructure
delivery. Furthermore, the accuracy of the estimates upon
which the contract cost is evaluated is critical, as departmental
budgetary ceilings restrict payments to contractors.
3. COMMUNITY-PARTNERED PROCUREMENT
A community contract is a contract between a community and
another partner (which could be for example the public sector,
the private sector, or a donor organisation) to undertake tasks to
improve or contribute to improving the living conditions of the
community. Since community contracting is relatively new, the
standard for community contracts is non-existent. The conven-
tional conditions of a contract are designed to use professional
contractors and as such are restrictive in terms of community
involvement. Community contracting can also be defined as ‘the
contracting out of the construction component of infrastructure
procurement to a community’. An early description of com-
munity construction contracts in the context of Sri Lanka is
provided by Pathirana and Sheng.8
Over the past few decades, technology and resource-based
development theories that concentrate on technology transfer
have been replaced by theories advocating the use of appro-
priate technology with community participation. These new
paradigms take a more people-orientated approach and involve
the intended beneficiaries in the planning and implementation
of projects. This approach is particularly apparent in micro-
projects, since conventional contracts, regulatory instruments
and legal frameworks typically lack explicit requirements for
contractors to involve communities in the installation, opera-
tion and maintenance of infrastructure or in the monitoring of
the quality of service received. For example the contract
typically does not define the roles and responsibilities of the
operator and of any community-based organisation involved
with the installation or maintenance of infrastructure or in
secondary distribution. Additionally, the contract may not
include a recommendation that communities be consulted in
the preparation of detailed service plans or make specifications
for a range of service delivery modes to be used to suit different
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circumstances. Furthermore, clear definitions of service delivery
are often not provided for ‘poor’ communities or those without
legal land title.
In general, the traditional bid evaluation process is based on a
system in which technical proposals are evaluated on the basis
of the lowest cost. The operator’s previous track record of
involving communities in service delivery often does not
count towards its chances of selection, thus there is little
incentive for large-scale operators, delivering conventional
technical solutions, to involve local communities in service
delivery.
Professionals involved in infrastructure provision have tradi-
tionally been interested in the efficiency with which faculties
have been provided, the costs of works, the time taken to
complete them and their quality. Community involvement in
infrastructure procurement is aimed to address these traditional
concerns but also ensures that service provision is more
relevant to local needs, the physical and financial conditions
and the social and institutional circumstances. Such an
approach would ensure that services could be operated and
maintained in a sustainable fashion such that they improve
people’s environments and life chances. Community contract-
ing may also result in empowerment-related goals in terms of
increased access to information, increased ability to negotiate
with external stakeholders in urban service provision, and
direct and indirect economic benefits from procurement for
communities. Further details of community-contracting pro-
jects can be found in References 10–12.
Narrative Commentary
1. Formulation of a scheme
and its requirements
Need not necessarily be done by the engineering department (ED); the ED procurement
procedure starts once the requirements of the scheme have been put before it, regardless of
their origin.
2. Preliminary cost estimates
are prepared
In general, the basis is ‘rule of thumb’ and use of past data.
3. Administrative approval of
estimates
Approval by the designated officials authorises the initiation of the work. The larger the scale of
the works, the more senior is the approving official. Some officials, such as the chief engineer,
have unlimited powers.
4. Preparation of surveys,
designs and detailed cost
estimates
The basis of these cost estimates is the government-approved Schedule of Rates and approved
details. The Public Works Department (PWD) is the main source of reference in this regard.
5. Approvals by appropriate
officials in the ED; this
usually involves the chief
engineer and is termed
‘technical sanction’
Technical and financial feasibility authorisation. The official giving such approvals must be sure
that the proposed work is technically feasible and financially viable. The designs and estimates
are scrutinised in detail. The procedure prescribes the level of the official who is to give
approval depending on the scale of the works.
6. Notice inviting tender A notice to the potential contractors to submit tenders for the notified work. The procedure
prescribes the level at which the notice should be advertised: in the case of some very small-
scale works, pasting a notice on a board in the offices is sufficient; in the case of larger
contracts, the notice should be advertised in the national or international newspapers for a
minimum number of days.
7. Tender opening Offers are opened in the presence of a committee. The committee comprises a technical
section, legal branch and accounts department. The offers are read aloud in the presence of the
tenderers and recorded in a register. The committee then signs the register. The idea is to
ensure that no changes are made in the bid price after the bid opening.
8. Work order start date This signifies that start of the contract. This is a letter issued by the authorised official advising
the contractor to start the work within a certain number of days. The contract duration starts
from the date of issue of this letter.
9. Actual start date The date work starts on site may differ from the authorised date. Although in micro-contracts
there is no prescribed mobilisation advance, many work orders demand that the work be
started within seven working days from the date of issue of the work order.
10. Completion of the work This is marked by the date of the last measurement done at site. In many cases a ‘measurement
book’ is used and the designated official takes the measurements and enters them in the
presence of the contractor. In public-sector procurement governed by the PWD rules, the
entry in the measurement book is the final recording and cannot be challenged.
11. Facility becomes
operational
In some cases, the infrastructure does not come into use at the same time as the work contract
is completed. There are some time lags involved, for example between the time when water
supply pipelines are completed and when the water is actually supplied through those lines. For
the end user, the operational date of the infrastructure is important rather than just the date
when the contract is completed.
12. End of the defects liability
period
Marked by the last entry of the measurement book, as reflected in the completion certificate.
Usually six months after completion of the work.
Table 1. Standard engineering department procurement procedure9
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4. RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
This research explores approximately 800 micro-contracts
awarded by urban local authorities, special projects and NGOs
in South Asia. These contracts covered both conventional
tender contract and community contracting processes. An
analytical framework based on benchmarking and the develop-
ment of key performance indicators was applied to data relating
to micro-projects in the study countries. In this research,
benchmarking is understood as ‘a position against which
performance can be measured’ and performance indicators are
‘an item of information that is collected to record some aspect
of an activity or a system’.12
During the research programme, 125 detailed, semi-structured
interviews were conducted with contract administrators in both
the client and contractor organisations. The contract files were
also reviewed, including: the necessary approvals; dates when
such approvals were obtained; and who took the actual
decisions. The contract file is also important as it is used for the
audit purposes. The literature review, interview and focus group
discussions were used to
(a) analyse the process of procurement in low-income coun-
tries
(b) identify the stakeholders involved at each stage, along with
the roles and responsibilities of the people involved
(c) identify data relevant to each stage and their time and cost
dimensions
(d ) define the key performance indicators for community
contracts
(e) propose benchmarks for contracts.
Focus group discussions with 12 expert contract administrators
were used to validate the performance-monitoring indicators
and the proposed yardsticks. The indicators were field-tested on
a number of micro-contracts related to urban infrastructure.
4.1. Performance monitoring indicators
The past decade has seen considerable research into the
development and implementation of performance indicators for
many different types of construction work. A performance
indicator can be defined as ‘an item of information collected at
regular intervals to track the performance of a system’. For
example, the emphasis on total quality management has led to
benchmarking13 and this in turn has impacted on the develop-
ment of key performance indicators (KPIs). In the UK, these
initiatives were to a significant extent a direct response to both
the Latham14 and Egan reports.15 In 1999, the UK Department
of Trade and Industry launched its first set of KPIs and these in
turn have been developed for different sectors of the construc-
tion industry—for example, New Build Social Housing, New
Build Private Housing, Major Infrastructure Projects and so
on.16
These KPIs were then followed by indicators for different
disciplines—for example, for consultants, and for mechanical
and electrical contractors—and in 2001, by indicators aimed
specifically at design. Further details of these KPIs can be found
on the Construction Best Practice Programme website.17
Performance indicators have also been used in developing
countries to identify key areas for improvements and as a
useful tool for shaping further urban service delivery pro-
grammes and policies, particularly in terms of ‘micro-projects’.
Performance indicators for community micro-projects include
the dimensions of time, cost and quality, inter-organisation,
cooperation and partnership as well as socio-economic issues.
These indicators have been used as a valuable management tool
for monitoring and evaluating community contracting, by
highlighting successes and failures in the procurement process.
A wide variety of indicators were developed during this study.
More detailed discussion on the development of the perform-
ance indicators can be found in Reference 7. The following
indicators are of most relevance in the context of the present
paper (see Table 3 for a more detailed description). These
performance indicators can be broken down into quantitative
and qualitative types.
The quantitative performance indicators developed include the
following.
. R1 Cost growth = final contract cost/initial contract cost.
. R2 Time growth = final contract duration/initial contract
duration.
. R3 Lead time = time required to commence works/con-
tract duration.
. R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates.
. R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial
contract cost.
. R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final
contract cost.
. TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender
inviting stage or equivalent stage.
. TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of
contract.
. TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after
the contract is completed.
The use of ratios made it possible to compare the cost-related
data without normalisation, as the comparison is not between
the costs themselves but between the ratios. All the subsequent
benchmarks are defined as ratios.
The opinions of service users are also a critical component of
assessments of the quality of construction work. Qualitative
performance indicators for community contracting refer to
quality, inter-organisational cooperation and partnership and
socio-economic issues. These were investigated as part of an in-
depth participatory assessment.
(a) Quality: whether the contractor meets the required stan-
dards to measure quality performance.
(b) Inter-organisational cooperation and partnership: the ways
in which officials and the community interact, and the
degree of cooperation between them, can significantly
affect the efficiency and success of the project.
(c) Socio-economic issues: in addition to the infrastructure
itself a community may receive a number of other benefits
as a result of infrastructure procurement. These may be
skill development through training, increased employment
and feelings of empowerment.
The focus of this paper is on the analysis of some performance
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indicators relating to community contracting. The use of the
indicators is, in most cases, straightforward, with the need to
collate information on events, monitor trends, and track
changes in responsibility and control.
4.2. Data analysis
SPSS for Windows was used for statistical analysis in this
report. Table 2 presents the selected descriptive statistics for the
group of micro-projects studied. Table 3 provides the calculated
performance indicators. However, the information required to
calculate all the ratios for all the groups was not available.
The 95% confidence intervals and standard deviations were also
calculated. A measure of central tendency was chosen after
examining the consistency of the measures. In general, the
mean gives a consistent measure of the central tendency of the
data. Considering low effects on the overall outcome, consis-
tency across contracts of the different organisations, and taking
into consideration previous studies,18 the mean was taken as
the most appropriate indicator. The results were as outlined
below.
Analysis of the performance data shows that, when reviewing
the indicator—for example, R1 (cost growth)—obtained for the
community-partnered contracts awarded by SKAA (Sindh
Katchi Abadi Authority) the final contract cost was, on average,
only 0·67 times the initial cost (equivalent to a cost saving of
33% against the estimate). Hence it was found that the project
costs had been consistently overestimated. From the data
available and the supporting documentation it was not clear
why this was the case. (In such instances, further investigation
is needed with the respective managers.) This represents one
area where improvements could be made.
It should not of course be automatically assumed that this level
of performance is beneficial. While it represents a saving, there
is a downside—that is, original budgets may not be spent fully
and construction may be delayed as a result. This is evident
when factor R2 (time growth) is examined for the same SKAA
contracts. Analysis of indicator R2 shows that the average time
growth on the same projects was 1·43. This can be interpreted
as a 43% increase in the duration of the works compared to the
initial contract duration. On the projects managed by SKAA,
then, it is possible that there was consistent underspend at the
cost of delaying the delivery of goods, works, etc. This example
shows the type of analysis needed across the indicators to
arrive at a final view of the performance on the project(s).
Table 4 provides the range of mean value of the indicators and
the proposed yardsticks for future use. The existing best
performance in terms of cost growth in the contracts studied
compared well with construction industry benchmarks in the
United States18 —that is, an equivalent cost growth (R1) and
time growth (R2) are 0·92 and 1·08 respectively. Kaka and
Price19 reported an equivalent R2 for their data relating to
infrastructure construction in the United Kingdom to be 1·035.
The cost growth of the contract in this UK study was
approximately 3% cost growth, which is close to that reported
Organisational context Country No. of
non-community
contracts
No. of
community
contracts
Mean
contract
cost:
US$
Mean
contract
duration:
days
Poverty-related projects (project management
unit and city level authority) (SIP)
India 39 11 1200 53
Colombo Municipal Corporation (drainage and
project division) (city authority) (CMC)
Sri Lanka 85 0
National Housing and Development Authority
(NHDA)
Sri Lanka 0 59 5335 76
Clean Settlement Project Unit (CSPU) Sri Lanka 0 11 6108 83
Faisalabad Development Authority/Water and
Sanitation Agency (city authority and project
management unit) (FDA)
Pakistan 98 102 716 46
Karachi Municipal Corporation and Karachi
Development Authority (city authority)
(KMC/KDA)
Pakistan 130 56 75224 244
Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (provincial
authority) (SKAA)
Pakistan 53 28 6268 74
Orangi Pilot Project (NGO) (OPP) Pakistan 0 71 152 11
Anjuman-e Samaji-Behbood (CBO) (ASB) Pakistan 0 56 188 8
Total 405 394
Note: For currency conversion
»1˝00=115 Sri Lankan rupees
=70 Indian rupees
=80 Pakistani rupees
=US$1˝6
Table 2. Number of contracts used for development and testing of the indicators
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Items Mean Std dev. Median Range
Group 1. Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority:
R1 Cost growth 0˝67 0˝02 0˝67 0˝04
R2 Time growth 1˝43 0˝38 1˝44 0˝38
R3 Lead time 1˝85 2˝92 0˝89 9˝63
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates
R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost 1˝00 0˝00 1˝00 0˝00
R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost 1˝49 0˝04 1˝48 0˝10
TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage 57˝00 80˝51 24˝50 209˝00
TL6 Time taken from approval stage to contract stage 85˝00 92˝53 61˝50 289˝00
TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract    
TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed 16˝00 9˝21 15˝00 29˝00
Group 2. Poverty-related projects (project management unit and city-level authority) (SIP):
R1 Cost growth 0˝92 0˝10 0˝94 0˝28
R2 Time growth 1˝66 0˝94 1˝30 2˝62
R3 Lead time 1˝73 2˝47 0˝40 6˝08
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates 1˝00 0˝01 1˝00 0˝03
R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost 1˝05 0˝23 1˝08 0˝78
R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost 1˝16 0˝33 1˝14 1˝04
TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage 28˝50 24˝39 17˝50 51˝00
TL6 Time taken from approval stage to contract stage 92˝25 144˝40 21˝00 364˝00
TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract 17˝00 32˝03 1˝50 65˝00
TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed 40˝00 21˝26 39˝00 48˝00
Group 3. Faisalabad Development Authority/Water and Sanitation Agency (city authority and project management unit) (FDA):
R1 Cost growth 0˝97 0˝06 1˝00 0˝30
R2 Time growth 0˝77 0˝51 0˝70 3˝85
R3 Lead time 0˝68 1˝00 0˝51 7˝20
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates
R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost 1˝25 1˝13 1˝00 1˝13
R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost 1˝32 1˝14 1˝02 6˝84
TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage    
TL6 Time taken from approval stage to contract stage 31˝00 31˝19 25˝50 216˝00
TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract    
TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed    
Group 4. Orangi Pilot Project (NGO) (OPP):
R1 Cost growth 1˝08 0˝31 1˝14 0˝75
R2 Time growth 1˝59 1˝57 1˝00 5˝83
R3 Lead time    
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates    
R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost 1˝00 0˝00 1˝00 0˝00
R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost 1˝01 0˝35 0˝88 0˝86
TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage    
TL6 Time taken from approval stage to contract stage    
TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract    
TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed    
Group 5. National Housing and Development Authority (NHDA):
R1 Cost growth 1˝15 1˝59 0˝92 10˝56
R2 Time growth 2˝10 1˝39 1˝63 6˝55
R3 Lead time 0˝64 0˝59 0˝44 2˝33
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates 1˝03 0˝02 1˝02 0˝08
R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost 1˝00 0˝00 1˝00 0˝00
R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost 1˝09 0˝13 1˝09 0˝50
TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage 39˝72 64˝38 18˝00 256˝00
TL6 Time taken from approval stage to contract stage 47˝06 54˝16 32˝00 210˝00
TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract 24˝67 47˝64 5˝50 181˝00
TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed 56˝78 85˝43 16˝00 285˝00
Group 6. Clean Settlement Project Unit (CSPU):
R1 Cost growth 0˝86 0˝11 0˝88 0˝35
R2 Time growth 1˝31 0˝71 1˝00 2˝50
R3 Lead time 1˝79 1˝78 1˝13 4˝98
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates 1˝10 0˝17 1˝03 0˝55
R5 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost 1˝02 0˝06 1˝00 0˝22
R6 Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost 1˝20 0˝19 1˝14 0˝53
TL1 Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage 74˝73 81˝72 38˝00 289˝00
TL6 Time taken from approval stage to contract stage 96˝91 67˝89 81˝00 214˝00
TL9 Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract    
TL13 Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed 115˝09 86˝43 114˝00 263˝00
Table 3. Summary of intra-group performance analysis
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for the USA. The following are some salient points on the
general performance of community contracts.
The performance with respect to cost growth was superior to
that of time growth, since there seemed to be more effective
control of cost than control of time in the contracts.
Cost growth performance was superior in groups from SKAA
and FDA (Faisalabad Development Authority). This factor
indicates that the capacity to control relatively small-scale
contracts is available in those organisations, in part due to the
fact that cost escalation of more than 10% requires approval of
higher officials. In contrast, the time growth, generally, was
relatively high. This was because the officials did not attach
much priority to time control, with contract time extensions
being granted routinely. The other explanations given for the
poor time performance were civil riots, monsoon rains,
unavailability of materials and unstable political situations.
R4 (accuracy of preliminary technical estimated) gives an
indication of the accuracy of the estimates for sanction costs.
The best performance was in slum improvement projects (SIP)
(poverty-related projects in India), which was right on target.
The variation of R1 (cost growth) about the contract price was
calculated: as the contract cost increases, so does the cost
growth. The variation of R2 (time growth) about the contract
indicates that the time growth increases with the contact size.
There is scope for improvements in the engineers’ estimates R5
(proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract
cost) and R6 (proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the
final contract cost) with regard to initial and final contract
costs. This may well be related to the fact that the works
procedures dictate the use of national government rates for
estimation purposes, which in many cases were out of date and
bore no relation to market rates.
On average, the best lead/preparation time (R3) is 68% of the
construction contract duration. In terms of the contract time,
the lead time can be as high as 179%, as can be seen in the case
of the Clean Settlement Project Unit, Sri Lanka (CSPU). The time
taken for the preparation of the contract requires further
examination. No data on lead (preparation) time indicators exist
from countries other than those in this study. Lead times of
almost 50% of the contract duration are very high considering
the standard conditions for public works. There is a need to
streamline the procedure for awarding small-scale contracts to
reduce these high lead times, and so improve on the delivery of
urban services. The chain of administrative approval may be
reduced by delegation of authority. There is also a need for
officials to monitor their pre-contract performance; the indica-
tors developed here could be used for that purpose.
Table 5 shows the performance indicators with respect to
community labour days and training for the different project
groups. These indicators allow an estimate of the financial
benefit to the community and the circulation of money in the
local economy. Separate factors are used for male and female
workers; for example, based on the study of a project the
following data are obtained.
. 300 unskilled labour days @ $2 per day = $600.
. 40 skilled labour days @ $5 per day = $200.
. Materials purchased locally @ 40% of contract sum (say
$5000) = $2000.
This results in an additional $2800 circulating within the local
economy.
Table 6 indicates that members of the community—especially
women—were trained in various aspects of provision of
infrastructure. This is basically an added value of community-
partnered procurement. Training enables participants to moni-
tor the quality of work in micro-projects and improves the
capacity of the local community to manage its urban services,
which in turn makes those services more sustainable. The
research revealed that of all the projects reviewed there were no
recorded instances of work being rejected on the grounds of
poor quality; in fact, community members reported high levels
of satisfaction with community-partnered procurement because
the ‘social embeddedness’ of contractors in the local com-
munity creates a social pressure to do a good job. Residents
also stated that community-partnered contracting meant that if
a problem developed with the facility they could report it to the
contractor, which created a local accountability for the work.
Furthermore, any wrongdoing on the part of the contractor that
causes harm to the local community could lead to social
ostracism. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that work
done by micro-contracts is by no means free of faults; these
either go undetected, unreported or have no action taken about
them. This latter point implies collusion between the super-
vising authority and the contractor.
Performance indicators Range of
mean values
Midpoints Proposed
yardsticks
Cost growth (R1) 0˝67^1˝15 0˝91 9%
Time growth (R2) 0˝77^2˝10 1˝43 20%
Lead time (R3) 0˝64^1˝85 1˝24 20%
Accuracy of preliminary technical estimates (R4) 1˝00^1˝10 1˝05 5%
Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the initial contract cost (R5) 1˝00^1˝25 1˝12 12%
Proximity of engineers’ estimated cost and the final contract cost (R6) 1˝01^1˝49 1˝25 25%
Time taken from approval stage to reach the tender inviting stage or equivalent stage (TL1) 28˝50^74˝73 51˝46 50 days
Time taken from approval stage to contract stage (TL6)   
Time taken between tender invitation and the start of contract (TL9) 17˝00^24˝67 20˝83 20 days
Time taken to start operation and maintenance after the contract is completed (TL13) 16˝00^115˝09 65˝54 65 days
Table 4. Summary of inter-group performance analysis and proposed yardsticks
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The large range of labour/training days shown in Tables 5 and
6 partially reflects the amount of skilled and unskilled labour
required from community members for construction and
operations and maintenance of services within the case study
settlements. However, this discrepancy also reflects the varying
levels of community engagement in community-partnered
contracts; for example, the number of women trained was
much higher in National Housing and Development Authority
(NHDA) schemes in Sri Lanka than SIP schemes in India. This
difference reflects a number of policy initiatives in Sri Lanka
over recent years that have promoted the concept of self-help
and active beneficiary participation in planning and construc-
tion of common amenities in low-income settlements.
Wider impacts of community contracting include the following.
(a) Social and cultural impacts: changed attitudes and social
interaction for the better; cooperation between community
members; provision of a park enabled women and children
to spend more leisure time outside the home; the park also
created local social esteem, creation of local pride and
confidence and a can-do attitude.
(b) Community organisational impact: built organisational
capacity; feelings of empowerment; increased interaction
between women; involvement in monitoring quality;
increased level of ownership and care for facilities;
enthusiasm for working together collectively; people more
willing to pay for services.
(c) Political impacts: people more politically aware and
thought more carefully about how to vote; people wanted
firm commitments from politicians; increased political
activism.
Most of the indicators presented in this research are concerned
with performance at the level of the individual contract.
However, it is important to recognise that, when brought
together and analysed, the information obtained through such
indicators can be important in shaping programmes and
policies. For instance, indicators of the local employment
resulting from specific schemes featuring community-con-
tracted procurement might provide a strong rationale for the
development of changes in policy to encourage wider use of
community-partnered procurement.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This research has presented a method of performance analysis
using indicators for the appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of
micro-projects that are procured by community-contracting
Contexts Maximum Minimum Range Mean Mode
SIP number of days training: formal 2 0 2 0˝25 0
SIP number of days training: informal 15 0 15 6˝00 5
SIP number of women trained 5 2 3 3˝50 2
NHDA number of days training: formal 1 0 1 0˝89 1
Number of days training: informal 2 0 2 1˝00 2
Number of women trained 80 0 80 42˝17 30
CSPU number of days training: formal 3 1 2 1˝73 2
CSPU number of days training: informal 8 1 7 3˝00 1
CSPU number of women trained 69 20 49 40˝73 20
See Table 5 for explanation of abbreviations.
Table 6. Number of community training days and women trained per contract
Contexts Maximum Minimum Range Mean Mode
SKAA male unskilled 575 20 555 202˝00 20
SKAA male skilled 70 42 28 56˝00 42
NHDA male unskilled 40 15 25 26˝11 30
NHDA female unskilled 45 20 25 35˝28 40
NHDA male skilled 25 10 15 20˝28 20
NHDA female unskilled 50 20 30 29˝17 30
SIP male unskilled 500 115 385 299˝75 115
SIP female unskilled 300 85 215 165˝75 85
SIP male skilled 100 4 96 47˝25 4
SIP female skilled 0 0 0 0˝00 0
CSPU male unskilled 50 10 40 24˝55 20
CSPU female unskilled 75 15 60 35˝91 30
CSPU male skilled 30 10 20 18˝18 20
CSPU female skilled 50 10 40 28˝18 20
SIP=Poverty-related projects (project management unit and city level authority; CSPU=Clean Settlement Project Unit;
NHDA=National Housing and Development Authority; SKKA=Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority.
Table 5. Community labour days per contract
200 Engineering Sustainability 157 Issue ES4 Community-partnered contracts in developing countries Sohail  Baldwin
schemes. The findings comprise indicators and key yardsticks
developed by research involving not only professional experts
but also other stakeholders including the community and end-
users. In addition to standard measures of time and cost, the
performance indicators also refer to some of the wider socio-
economic impacts of community contracting for urban services.
These wider socio-economic impacts arising from community-
partnered micro-projects can lead to more sustainable infra-
structure through meeting local stakeholders’ needs, com-
munity empowerment and capacity building.
Performance indicators were developed to assess time, cost,
quality of work and socio-economic issues. In general, it was
found that costs for community-contracted micro-projects were
normally very close to being on target. The quality of
infrastructure and service provision also tended to be superior
to that envisioned. However, project duration generally
exceeded the target but was still comparable to conventional
contracts.
The performance analysis from this research confirms that the
procurement and execution of community-partnered small-
scale contracts is not only a technical matter but also has wider
socio-economic impacts. The overall performance of the com-
munity-partnered micro-projects was found to be comparable
to or better than the conventional micro-contracts; in addition,
the performance of these projects in terms of socio-economic
elements was likely to far exceed that of conventional micro-
projects. For example, the number of community labour days
generated by micro-contracts injects significant money into the
local economy.
The list of indicators and yardsticks represents a set of metrics
from which procurement teams and managers can select the
appropriate basis to monitor each contract under consideration.
Not all the indicators need to be used on every project.
Conversely, on some projects users may decide to use
additional indicators to meet specific project needs.
It is concluded that through the judicious use of performance
analysis and taking appropriate actions, procurement of micro-
projects can be improved. The findings presented, therefore,
make an important contribution to the management of com-
munity-partnered micro-projects in developing countries.
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